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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1990, a growing number of countries have adopted explicit inflation targeting (IT) 
around the world and many assessments have been performed. Although its early advocates 
(Bernanke et al., 1999) pointed to the many advantages of IT, empirical evidence has been 
mixed so far. One reason for this relatively poor evidence has been that in a world where 
inflation has declined substantially since the early 1980s, it is rather difficult to emphasize the 
country-specific impact of IT on inflation outcomes.  
 
In this paper, we evaluate the existence of a regime switch after IT adoption in three 
industrialised economies: Canada, Sweden and the UK. Unlike most of the empirical 
literature so far, we do not perform immediately a comparison with non-IT countries. Our first 
intention consists in determining clearly the specific outcomes of these IT countries. 
Therefore, we report individual estimates for each of the three countries. Although they are 
relatively different one from the other, common results are interpreted as an indication of the 
existence of a specific behaviour under an IT regime. These common results do not only 
involve inflation outcomes but also the level of the monetary policy rate, output gap 
outcomes, and uncertainty. In a second stage, we compare these outcomes with those 
occurring in a non-IT country, the US. Hence, we are able to assess the robustness of our 
conclusions on the specificities of IT countries. Moreover, under this methodology, we 
circumvent the self-selection issue of the control group methodology where estimations are 
performed simultaneously on countries which are not fully comparable.  
 
A multivariate Markov-Switching VAR model methodology, in the vein of Hamilton (1994) 
and Sims and Zha (2006), is applied to the three countries. Contrary to the latter, no subjective 
priors are introduced in the model and the number of endogenous variables is reduced. The 
framework is close to the New Keynesian type. Two types of model are investigated: model 1 
with full changes, i.e. changes in coefficients and in intercept and variance; and model 2 
where changes across “regimes” are only due to intercept and variance.  
 
The main common results to the three countries can be summarized as follows. First, 
according to model 1, IT does not constitute a change in monetary policy reaction. Second, 
model 2 reveals the existence of a specific IT regime and a better predictability of policy 
responses under this regime. Third, the IT regime is robust to a change in the sample. Under a 
sample excluding the 1970s and early 1980s characterised by inflation volatility and the 
sharpest decline in inflation rates, the behaviour of the IT regime is shown to be quite 
different from that of other existing regimes. Fourth, the sacrifice ratio of higher output 
volatility generally attributed to inflation stabilisation policies is not modified under an IT 
regime. Last, the monetary policy leeway is shown to be higher during IT periods: inflation 
targeting actually permits to adopt a more flexible monetary policy strategy, i.e. low real 
interest rates. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with the characteristics of 
an IT strategy. Empirical evidence on IT countries is reviewed and the choice of the three 
countries and the underlying model is discussed. In section 3, the empirical methodology is 
presented and results are commented upon. Robustness checks and counterfactuals are 
performed. Section 4 summarises our conclusions.  
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2. A First Look at IT 
 
2.1. Does it Matter? 
 
A great deal of attention has been paid to IT in the recent literature devoted to monetary 
policy1. As such, this strand has advocated a general framing of monetary policymaking, 
encompassing clear targets, accountable policymakers and a flexible strategy. In the words of 
its promoters, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999), inflation targeting should be viewed as a 
“framework” rather than as a prescription of adopting mechanical rules like the Taylor rule2. 
 
The essence of IT lies somewhere between rules and discretion, and has been labelled: 
“constrained discretion”. In the words of his promoters: “Inflation targeting is a framework 
for monetary policy characterized by the public announcement of official quantitative targets 
(…) for the inflation rate (…); by explicit acknowledgment that low, stable inflation is 
monetary policy’s primary long-run goal; (…) (by) vigorous efforts to communicate with the 
public about the plans and objectives of the monetary authorities, and (…) mechanisms that 
strengthen the central bank’s accountability for attaining those objectives.” (Bernanke et al., 
1999, p.4). Later on, they add: “By imposing a conceptual framework and its inherent 
discipline on the central bank, but without eliminating all flexibility, IT combines some of the 
advantages traditionally ascribed to rules (discipline, stability) with those ascribed to 
discretion (flexibility)” (Bernanke et al., 1999, p.4, words in bold added).  
 
The IT framework can be related to discipline in that it anchors expectations thanks to the 
publicly announced inflation target range; but it permits some flexibility: deviations from the 
target do not incur a loss of credibility and reputation provided the reasons for the deviations 
are explained to the public. This flexibility gives some leeway to monetary policy and gives 
IT framework a specific feature that the Taylor rule cannot fully retain.  
 
In the recent past, some OECD countries turned formally to an IT regime (see table 6.1 in Ball 
and Sheridan, 2003): between New-Zealand, which did it in 1990, and Spain, which did in 
1995, five others did like Canada, Sweden and the UK. These institutional regime shifts raised 
questions on their direct incidence on the optimality of implemented monetary policy, e.g., 
have (expected) interest and inflation rates been lower than in non IT countries? 
 
Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2003) made important contributions to the assessment 
of the effects of IT on the countries which adopted it, developing cross-country studies with a 
control group. Their conclusion were mixed: whereas Johnson produced evidence of lower 
expected inflation in IT countries after the announcement of targeting, Ball and Sheridan 
found no evidence of a beneficial impact of IT on a country’s economic performance in 
comparison with non-IT countries. Economic performance was assessed using a very large 
scope of indicators: inflation, inflation variability, inflation persistence, output growth, output 
variability, long-term interest rates, and variability of short-run interest rates.  
 
                                                 
1 A critical presentation can be found in Kuttner (2004). 
2 Beyond its potential mechanical feature, the Taylor rule poses two main problems. First, it may produce 
indeterminacies, either related to the price level (Woodford, 2001), or to the equilibrium trajectories (Benhabib 
et al., 2001). Second, Qin and Enders (2008) concluded that the out-of-sample forecasting performance of a US 
Taylor rule were better than a univariate AR model before 1979, but not after although the first assessment by 
Taylor (1993) pointed to its accuracy between the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The relevance of the Taylor rule 
for anchoring monetary expectations is at stake. 
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These latter results raised many doubts on the empirical validity of the methodology of 
adopting a control group. These doubts can be summarized by the following comments by 
Gertler (2003): “(Ball and Sheridan) make two main arguments:  
1. The existing evidence in favour of inflation targeting is open to identification 
problems. 
2. After taking into account this identification problem, the evidence suggests that 
inflation targeting has been irrelevant. 
(…) The essence of the authors’ argument is that the endogeneity of inflation targeting makes 
the existing evidence difficult to interpret. I will argue that this same endogeneity problem 
potentially clouds the interpretation of their empirical tests. In particular, to the extent that 
there is not much exogenous variation in the choice to adopt inflation targeting, it may be 
very difficult to identify the effects, particularly in a small sample. (…) (M)any of the 
nontargeters (if not just about all) (…) adopted monetary policies that were very similar in 
practice to formal inflation targeting. This lack of sharpness in the classification scheme 
further complicates the task of disentangling the contribution of inflation targeting.” 
 
Later on, Gertler (2003) gives an example of how a non-IT country may finally behave like an 
IT one without officially adopting IT : “Even though Norway is not officially a targeter, it 
appears to have tied its monetary policy to a country that does inflation target (i.e., Sweden). 
It has done so by stabilizing its currency relative to the Swedish currency. In doing so, it may 
have reaped the benefits from inflation targeting.” 
 
Despite this criticism, other empirical papers using a cross-country study have recently 
validated Ball and Sheridan (2003)’s early results. For instance, Angeriz and Arestis (2007) 
do not find a significant break in the estimated evolution of inflation in the UK after the 
adoption of inflation targeting. Comparing with a control group made of the US and EMU 
shows that central banks which do not pursue IT strategy have performed “at least as well” as 
the UK. According to the authors, this is not surprising since “in the UK, IT was introduced 
after inflation had been tamed.”  
 
On the contrary, Levin et al. (2004) show that in comparison with non-IT countries, inflation 
targeters have been able to better anchor long-run inflation expectations and have experienced 
lower inflation persistence.  
 
Using a more sophisticated methodology, Cecchetti et al. (2002) conclude that the extent to 
which IT exerts a measurable influence on monetary policy is limited. They quantify the 
monetary transmission mechanism of EU countries using a structural autoregression 
approach; then, they compute the revealed preferences of each national central bank in terms 
of the trade off between inflation and output variability to gauge differences among targeters 
and non-targeters. They conclude that differences are minimal. 
 
These different papers are all confronted with the control group problem first enlightened by 
Gertler (2003) in this strand of the literature, but they are also with the self-selection problem 
of policy adoption (Lin and Ye, 2007): what may have led actually to lower inflation in IT 
countries was their decision to aim specifically at lower inflation than in earlier (pre-IT) 
periods. As Anna Schwartz has been attributed to put it, IT would be “window-dressing”.  
 
Lin and Ye (2007) produce a statistical assessment of the possible effects of inflation 
targeting strategy on inflation, inflation variability, long-term interest rates and the income 
velocity of money using propensity score matching methods. They claim to address the self-
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selection problem of disentangling between IT and non-IT countries. Their dataset 
incorporates seven IT countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
and the UK) and fifteen industrial non-IT countries. They conclude that IT has had no 
significant effects. Whereas propensity score matching is of particular interest in micro 
empirics, the reliability of this method applied to macroeconomic data remains questionable: 
matching aggregates is confusing3, the control group problem remains4, and the use of annual 
data seems to stand in opposition with the need for a very large dataset.  
 
A new strand of the literature has developed which permits to date breaks and new regimes 
while letting data speak. The use of Markov-Switching VAR (MSVAR) can relaunch the 
interest for empirical studies applying time series technique. It also enables to circumvent the 
control group problem and to study thoroughly the different regimes which have occurred in 
these IT countries. Moreover, the choice of regimes rather than pure breaks enables to check 
the argument that good monetary performances in IT countries had already existed in the past, 
either shortly before its adoption or hand-in-hand with the “Great Moderation” process, i.e. 
exogenously to IT adoption.  
 
Unlike earlier attempts (see Ammer and Freeman, 1995), sufficiently-long samples since IT 
adoption will eventually produce the occurrence of a new regime. Ammer and Freeman had 
estimated a canonical VAR whose sample stopped just before inflation targets were first 
announced, and then, they compared actual values for GDP, inflation, and the real interest rate 
with the (out-of-sample) forecasted ones. They interpreted the difference between both 
variables – actual and forecasted – as evidence of a change of regime. Using MSVAR 
technique can reveal a new regime rather than assume it.  
 
Moreover, the MSVAR permits to go further than only checking for a change in regime that 
would only occur at the level of the monetary reaction function5. First, tests of these functions 
generally do not capture multiple shifts in variance because they do not make enough 
allowance for heteroskedasticity. Second, identification of forward-looking monetary reaction 
functions is generally fragile.6 Third, inflation-targeting is not about interest rate rules but it is 
a conceptual framework which promotes the optimality of constrained discretion for monetary 
policy.  
 
2.2. Selected countries  
 
In the following, we concentrate on three industrialized IT countries, the biggest ones among 
the best performers7: Canada, Sweden and the UK. The reasons for the choice of these three 
countries have been twofold. First, the choice has been driven by the need of some similarities 
                                                 
3 Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) showed that data quality and information content are a 
crucial ingredient to any reliable estimation strategy. Such aggregates like inflation, broad money growth and 
government fiscal balance, may hide high differences, e.g. seemingly comparable fiscal balance may stem from 
different variations in cyclically-adjusted and automatic components, therefore indicating different fiscal stances. 
4 All countries have experienced common macroeconomic evolution (for instance strong disinflation) and the 
authors themselves note that “one can reasonably suspect that the low inflation (variability) might be caused by 
some common uncontrolled factors that affect both targeting and non-targeting countries”.  
5 Muscatelli et al. (2002) conclude on the instability of univariate estimations of forward-looking interest rate 
functions in the case of inflation targeting countries. Kuttner (2004) estimates forward-looking rules to assess the 
flexibility of central banks’ strategies distinguishing IT and non-IT countries.  
6 These first two remarks are developed in section 2 of Sims and Zha (2006).  
7 Gosselin (2007) ranks UK, Canada and Sweden respectively 2nd, 4th and 5th in terms of mean absolute deviation 
of actual inflation from target. Switzerland and New Zealand are ranked respectively 1st and 3rd.  
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among them; a minimum set of similarities is required to perform a sensible international 
comparison. But, second, a minimum set of differences is also required in that it enables to 
assess the robustness of IT country-performances: despite differences, the fact that IT 
performances may be comparable would be an answer to the papers which state that monetary 
institutional design cannot explain a change in policy outcomes and that these changes come 
fully from external factors, like the exchange rate or the world disinflation era of the early 
1980s to 1990s, i.e. the so-called “Great Moderation”.  
 
Among the similarities between these three countries, one finds that they are in a flexible de 
jure exchange rate regime and are part of trade agreements which make competitiveness a 
crucial growth factor: Sweden and the UK are European Union members, hence part of the 
EU Single Market; unlike Spain, which was an inflation targeter between 1995 and 1998, they 
have not adopted the Euro. As for Canada, it is part of the North American Free Trade Area. 
The three countries can also be considered to follow a de facto peg regime: Sweden and the 
UK are mimicking the ERM II, except during financial turmoil; and Canada looks like having 
a peg with fluctuation bands vis-à-vis the US dollar.  
 
Among the differences, one finds economic structures and the respective degrees of openness. 
Canada benefits from abundant natural resources, whereas the UK has a prominent part of its 
economy that is driven by the tertiary sector. Sweden stands halfway between those two, with 
industrial activities and services taking a prominent share of overall activity. Moreover, the 
size of the UK economy is paramount in comparison with Canada and even more so in 
comparison with Sweden. In 2007, Canada’s GDP, expressed in volume and in PPP figure, 
represented 58% of UK’s; and Sweden’s only 16%, based upon OECD data. As for the degree 
of openness, which may have an impact on imported inflation, it was similar for Canada and 
the UK in 2007 (total imports were worth 34% of GDP), but Sweden was much higher (67%).  
 
IT has been adopted in Canada in February 1991 and has been in its completion form at the 
end of 1995 when the decelerating path of inflation8 was transformed in a fixed target range. 
The same process has taken place in the UK: an adoption in October 1992 and a completion in 
May 1997 that corresponds to the statute change of the Bank of England and its independence 
declaration. In Sweden, IT has been adopted in January 1993 with the objective to be fully 
applied in January 1995. Contrary to the other countries, the inflation target has remained the 
same since the beginning of the IT regime and no decelerating path of inflation occurred.  
 
2.3. Data and the underlying model 
 
We use monthly data, from 1971:1 to 2006:12 for the UK and Canada and from 1987:1 to 
2007:12 for Sweden9. The interest rate is the central bank reference rate as advertised by 
central banks themselves. The inflation rate expressed in month-over-month growth rate is the 
measure of inflation targeted by central banks. For the UK, the series is extrapolated from 
RPIX, RPI and CPI-H, the harmonised index of consumer prices. In Canada, the series is the 
CPI excluding eight of the most volatile components; and for Sweden, UND1X is used. In the 
latter two countries, the targeted measure corresponds to core inflation. The output gap 
                                                 
8 On most figures, the transition period between the adoption of IT and its completion in final form has been 
represented by a grey area. 
9 We extend the Sweden sample until 2007 although data will certainly be adjusted, because the MSVAR 
methodology needs long time series and this particular sample starts only in 1987. 
 6
measure is the interpolated monthly measure of the OECD10. The inflation variables are 
expressed in first difference of the price index and all variables in the VAR and MSVAR are 
expressed in percent. 
 
Models with three to six variables have been tested; they have always included the central 
bank interest rate, the inflation rate (either CPI, GDP deflator or core CPI), and the output 
gap, and they have been extended to real GDP, M2, energy prices and/or exchange rate.  
 
Contrary to Sims and Zha (SZ, 2006) who always include a monetary aggregate, commodity 
prices and the unemployment rate, we have finally focused on a smaller structural model 
comprising only three endogenous variables: the output gap, the nominal short-run interest 
rate and the officially-targeted CPI index. The focus on core inflation in Canada and Sweden, 
in line with their central banks’ objectives and in countries which are highly opened to 
international trade, challenges the possible drawback of an analysis undertaken in a closed 
economy framework because imported inflation plays a relative minor role in core inflation. 
 
Residuals of the canonical VAR model extended to include M2 are reported in Appendix A. 
They help to legitimate the three-variable-only VAR. Three results emerge. First, adding M2 
has no noteworthy effects on the residuals of the interest rate, the output gap and the inflation 
rate. Exception is the UK as far as the inflation rate is concerned: the fit with M2 is worse 
than without this variable. Second, the overall fit of the canonical VARs is poor. Third, 
multiple shifts in variance have occurred in the three countries and point to the adoption of a 
more sophisticated methodology like MSVAR. 
 
Disregarding M2, as it does not seem to improve the fit, has two additional advantages. First, 
it saves some degrees of freedom, and this is important specifically for countries like Sweden 
for which data are available on a very short time period, but also on general grounds because 
MSVARs are pretty much “data-consuming”: the number of parameters to estimate depends 
on the number of variables, lags and states and can quickly be explosive11. Second, no ad hoc 
restrictions are needed to separate money demand and supply, or to make sure that money 
demand (supply) reacts negatively (positively) to the interest rate.  
 
The three endogenous variables fit also relatively well in the new Keynesian framework 
which has developed at the same time as the IT literature. However, the underlying model 
cannot retain all the specificities of the new framework (see Walsh, 2003, for a presentation), 
which can be described by:  
ttttttt uEixEx +−−= ++ )(1 11 πσ  
ttttt exE ++= + κπβπ 1  
t
T
ttttt xEEi γππαπ +−+= ++ )( 11  
 
where x is the output gap, i the nominal short-run interest rate, π is the inflation rate, E is the 
expectation operator, σ is the marginal utility of consumption, is the inflation target, and u 
and e are disturbances. The first equation is the demand side of the economy, representing a 
linear approximation to the representative household’s Euler condition for optimal 
Tπ
                                                 
10 Despite an empirical agnostic approach (see infra), the use of a computed measure like the output gap will 
permit to interpret the results in terms of the new Keynesian framework (see also infra).  
11 With n variables, p lags and m states, there are m × (n × (n × p + 1) + (n × (n – 1)/2) parameters for the VAR 
plus m × (m – 1) elements in the transition probabilities matrix.  
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consumption (hence, the expectational IS curve); the second equation gives inflation whose 
adjustment is derived under the assumption of monopolistic competition, with individual 
firms adjusting prices in a staggered, overlapping fashion; the third equation involves 
monetary policy represented by a rule for setting the nominal interest rate.  
 
Within a VAR representation, the above 3-equation model would be based on a reduced-form 
which would make impossible to distinguish regimes shifts from one structural equation to the 
other12. Thus, we adopt the nonlinear stochastic dynamic simultaneous equations model of SZ 
(2006). Moreover, lags are included and the empirical model will depart from a pure new 
Keynesian model which predicts nearly no persistence, except that coming from shocks ,  
or the inflation target 
tu te
Tπ 13. The fact that the general framework is close to the new Keynesian 
fully coherent framework will permit to interpret on economic grounds the different results 
deriving from the estimated model.  
 
3. A MSVAR Analysis 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
3.1.1. The Multivariate Markov-Switching Model14
 
The Markov-Switching VAR, as proposed by Hamilton (1994), allows the structural 
coefficients and the covariance matrix to be dependent on an unobserved state variable St 
which is assumed to follow a 1st order Markov chain. The joint distribution of the shocks can 
be non-constant across our sample periods. 
 
The general framework is described by the following equation: 
{
1,...,
1,...,~ (0, )
β= ⋅ +⎧ =⎪⎨ =Σ⎪⎩
t
t
t t S t
tt t S
y x u t T
S Mu S N }
t
                                     (1) 
 
where  is an 1  vector of endogenous variables, with n the number of 
variables of interest, 
1, ,( ,..., )=t t py y y ×n
tx  is an 1 vector of p lagged endogenous variables,  is an 
unobserved state, 
×np tS
β  is an  vector of parameters, T is the sample size and M the number 
of states (or regimes). This baseline equation of the model is free of restrictions
1×np
15. 
The covariance matrix 
tSΣ takes the form: 
2 ( )
tS S tS Iσ pΣ = ⋅  
                                                 
12 The 1st and 3rd equations of the system under a reduced-form involve the disturbance on inflation.  
13 See Gali et al. (2001) for an empirical characterisation of “hybrid Phillips curve”, where inertial processes are 
introduced in the new Keynesian setting.  
14 See Hamilton (1994, chapter 22) for more in-depth details.  
15 Since we do not know ex ante the possible changes of monetary policy effects implied by IT and because the 
empirical approach is data driven (i.e. we are looking for what data tell us about this framework setting aside any 
preconceived conclusions), we do not impose restrictions on parameters. The ad hoc nature of restrictions is 
opposed to the seminal motivation of our methodology. The use of Bayesian techniques, though it represents a 
great advancement in structural estimation, run up against the same motivation. Indeed, the link between 
estimation and calibration is strong and depends on subjective priors, which we chose not to use. In the end, the 
nearest method to Bayesian one is the Maximum Likelihood’s, which is free of calibration as our approach 
needs.  
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The transition probabilities matrix, noted P, is defined following Hamilton (1994): 
11 1
12 2
1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
L
L
M L M
L
M
M
M M
p p
p p
P
p p M
,  
with  and 
1
1
=
=∑M kj
j
p { }0, , 1...≥ ∀ ∈kjp k j M
tu
. 
Two models are tested: 
1(1 , ,..., ) tt n t t p Sy y y β− −= ⋅ +
tu
 
11 ( ,..., )tt n S t t py y yβ δ− −= ⋅ + ⋅ +  
 
and can be written as:                       
tt t Sy x z utβ δ= ⋅ + ⋅ +                                                (2) 
 
M different models are then simultaneously estimated such as:  
1
1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
M
p t t M p t t ty x zβ β δ⊗ = ⋅ + ⊗ ⋅ +L Lu u
j
 
 
and leads for a given regime  to: tS =
~ (0, )
t t j t
t t j
ty x z
u S j N
β δ u= ⋅ + ⋅ +⎧⎪⎨ = Σ⎪⎩
 
 
Initial values of the vector of parameters are calculated. A conditional probability density 
function is defined according to the information set in t-1. The model is recursively estimated 
through the Maximum likelihood “EM” algorithm, starting from the unconditional density 
of ty which is calculated by summing conditional densities over possible values for . The 
maximum likelihood estimates are finally obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
and allows to attain the final matrix of parameters.  
tS
 
3.1.2. Specification  
 
Based on Hamilton (1989, 2004)’s method and SZ (2006)’s work, various specifications were 
considered in which the numbers of regimes and lags were allowed to vary. We considered 
specifications in which coefficients and residual variance switch and specifications in which 
only intercept and variance switch. In light of some SZ’s findings, we have not tried 
“particularly ill-fitting models” like those with a single regime or those in which regime 
changes are constrained to never occur again. 
 
With the 3-variable VAR (see supra), we allowed for 2 or 3 regimes to occur on the whole 
sample. Because of our interest in inflation, at least two regimes were possible: one with 
relatively high inflation, around the successive oil shocks of the 1970s, and one with 
relatively low inflation thereafter. A third regime may have therefore occurred since IT 
regime was adopted, separating the second period into two distinct ones.  
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Therefore we favour the 3-state specification. SZ (2006) have analysed a 4-state specification, 
but the 4th regime is rare and it always occurred during geopolitical crises: Tehran’s hostages 
in 1980, the beginning of t sthe 1  Irak war in 1991, and 9/11. The three countries under study 
ere not engaged in comparable events and with comparable intensity so that a 4th regime 
he Schwarz criterion for the 3-variable VAR specification gave the following numbers of 
r Sweden and 5 for the UK. 
 
3.2. R
 
anged significantly since the 
te 1970s . It may first capture the main characteristics of this conventional wisdom and 
2 also occurred under IT. Regime 3 almost 
isappeared with completion of IT. The steady-state probabilities range from 0.51 for Regime 
sponds to the date of adoption of IT. More than 
alf of the steady-state probability (0.64) is associated with Regime 1, whereas Regime 2 has 
 of Regime 1. Regime 3 took place only before IT and never after. Finally, the 
robability of standing in Regime 1 is 0.41, to be compared with 0.42 for Regime 2 and 0.17 
h IT, but IT periods are shared between 2 
gimes (Canada and Sweden) and/or characterized by a regime that already occurred 
significantly before (Canada, UK and Sweden).  
                                                
w
does not seem necessary.  
 
T
lags: p = 3 for Canada, 4 fo
egime Switches 
3.2.1. Full Changes 
 
In this section, we present the key results of the 3-equation specification with changes in 
coefficients and variances. This pattern is of interest because it follows the widespread idea 
that monetary policy and the structure of the economy have ch
16la
may also describe the policy change ensuing from IT adoption. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the implied state-probabilities17 over time produced by this model for 
Canada. Regime 1 did not prevail before the beginning of the 1980s, dominated the end of 
this decade and has been the main regime since roughly the middle of the 1990s. Regime 2 
dominated the 1970s and has appeared sporadically since then, whereas Regime 3 occurred 
almost exclusively between 1979 and 1982. Regime 1 seems to fit best during IT period, but 
occurred before that period, while Regime 
d
1, 0.36 for Regime 2, to 0.13 for the last one.  
 
Figure 2 describes the state probabilities for the UK. Regime 1 prevailed since the beginning 
of the sample, with a probability of occurrence rising over time. Regime 2 occurred during 
almost the whole sample but did not ever significantly; whereas Regime 3 took place in the 
1970s, and progressively lost influence during the 1980s to finally disappear at the beginning 
of the 1990s. The adoption of IT does not seem to have corresponded to a regime switch, but 
more to the continuation of the main ‘old regime’. The disappearance of Regime 3, the second 
most prominent over the full sample, corre
h
a probability of 0.16 and Regime 3 of 0.20. 
 
Figure 3 focuses on state probabilities for Sweden. Regime 1 prevails mainly after IT 
adoption, but irregularly so. Indeed, Regime 2 has also occurred after (and only after) 1993, 
always in place
p
for Regime 3. 
 
In the three cases, a regime appears to end wit
re
 
16 See, e.g. Clarida et al. (2000).  
17 Figures depict at each date the average probability to stand in the corresponding regime over the last 6 months. 
 10
 
These findings tend to prove that IT adoption has not constituted a monetary policy change 
per se, contrary to the above-mentioned conventional wisdom. However, the methodology 
reveals that adopting IT in the 3 countries clearly meant that a pre-existing regime was taken 
 an end.  
e best-fit model of SZ (2006) with US data.  
 
3.2.2. Intercept and Variance only 
r the change of monetary policy framework has induced changes in 
isturbances terms.  
 during the IT period has occurred in 
anada, where Regimes 2 and 1 are complementary. 
r fits IT-period than pre-IT-
eriod. The state probabilities are 0.05, 0.75 and 0.20. 
me 3 during 
e transition period. The state probabilities are 0.69, 0.25 and 0.06 respectively.  
almost always existed, though uncertainty surrounding it is the 
west during the IT period.  
e same effect. All in all, IT should produce 
wer uncertainty regarding inflation and output.  
 
to
 
These results lead to focus on the intercept and variance only specification where coefficients 
are kept fixed on the whole period. Thus, it allows to shed light more precisely on the 
variation of the non-coefficients changes. This specification has been shown to correspond to 
th
 
Contrary to the previous section, coefficients are assumed to be the same across regimes, and 
we focus on whethe
d
 
Figure 4 shows the probabilities across time for Canada. Regime 1 seems to emerge 
significantly with the completion of IT, while Regime 2 and even more notably Regime 3 
appear to vanish during the same period. The state probabilities are respectively 0.33, 0.54 
and 0.13 on the whole sample. A transition period
C
 
Figure 5 presents the probabilities of regimes occurrence for UK. Here again, two regimes 
(the 1st and 3rd) disappear with the development of IT but, contrary to Canada, the regime that 
characterizes IT has occurred from the beginning of the sample. However, uncertainty around 
this regime is null after the adoption of IT while much higher before (because Regime 1 and 3 
occurred several times during the pre-period), meaning it bette
p
 
Figure 6 displays the probabilities for Sweden. The results are quite straightforward: Regime 
1 occurred quite consistently after the adoption of IT, Regime 2 before and Regi
th
 
At this point, we can find a regime in each country which fits the IT period. In the case of the 
UK however, the regime has 
lo
 
Matching regimes with IT period requires more than chronological coincidence. Attributing 
the regime switch to IT adoption can be handled along the following procedure. One can 
check that the regime which matches IT chronologically does it also in terms of the properties 
which are attributed to it. The IT framework assumes that the monetary policy regime can mix 
discipline and flexibility and can reduce overall variability (see supra and Kuttner, 2004). 
Discipline, in the vein of Barro and Gordon (1983), should refrain central banks (or 
government in their seminal framework) from using their instruments, hence taming their 
‘inflation bias’. Consequently, deviations of variables from their steady-state values would be 
minimal. Policy flexibility after a shock, insofar as it cushions the shock and helps variables 
to converge towards the steady-state, produces th
lo
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Within a setting where coefficients remain constant, the reducing-uncertainty property of IT 
can be captured by the values of the constant terms and the variance in the inflation and 
output gap equations. Restraining to variance only may hide sharp moves in inflation or 
output gap that would appear in the constant term.  
 
In dealing with the specific patterns of the regime we wish to attribute to IT, it is worth noting 
that group transition matrices for all countries and specifications18 show that the three states 
behave quite differently. It means that the regime we wish to attribute to IT behaves 
differently from the other two regimes. Moreover, a glance at the values of the constant terms 
and the variance which are reported for the three countries in table 1 gives straightforward 
results. Indeed, it is very clear that regimes which have been considered so far to correspond 
to IT are effectively those for which uncertainty has been the smallest: Regime 1 for Canada 
and Sweden, and Regime 2 for the UK19.  
 
The IT period has thus corresponded to a specific regime for each country along which 
uncertainty has been minimised. Finally, results suggest the following conclusions: IT has 
produced a regime switch and IT has worked in these three countries in the sense that policy 
outcomes have been improved.  
 
3.3 Robustness analysis 
 
In this section, we provide some evidence on the robustness of our results. First, we focus on 
the relevance of model and specification 2. Second, we study a subsample starting once the 
sharpest disinflation period has ended. Over this subsample, we assess whether changes in 
variance are still concomitant with the adoption of IT. Third, we perform tests with US data 
and compare US outcomes with those of IT countries: differences between the US and the 
other countries are interpreted as evidence of the specificities of IT countries. 
 
3.3.1 Model and specification 
 
Table 2 reports “artificial long run responses” of the policy rate to both objectives of 
monetary policy, as presented by SZ20. We annualise inflation variable to match the annual 
rate of interest and the output gap. Estimates of responses of the interest rate to macro 
variables are in line with monetary practice and with the usual weights attributed to or 
estimated for central banks’ objectives in the literature. The tough reaction of the Sveriges 
Riksbank to inflation and the revealed relative high preference for inflation vis-à-vis the 
output gap is comparable to results reported by Kuttner (2004). The under reaction of the 
policy rate to inflation and the relative lower inflation preference by the Bank of England in 
comparison with the Sveriges Riksbank is similar to Muscatelli et al. (2002)’s estimates (over 
their subsample 1980-1999), or to Clarida et al. (1998). Results for Canada are also 
comparable to Muscatelli et al. (2002) over the subsample 1980-1999. Thus, figures obtained 
for the long run policy responses suggest that the underlying model is relevant.  
 
                                                 
18 See appendices B and C. 
19 Intercepts of the output gap are never statistically different from zero whichever the regime.  
20 According to SZ,  “(artificial long run responses) are neither an equilibrium outcome nor multivariate impulse 
responses, but are calculated from the policy reaction function alone, asking what would be the permanent 
response in (the policy rate) to a permanent increase in the level or rate of change of the variable in question, if 
all other variables remained constant”. 
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Investigation of consistency of intercept-and-variance-only specification is pursued with 
estimates of the model’s impulse dynamic responses as shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9. Shocks 
are identified through a Cholesky decomposition of innovations where variables have been 
ordered as: policy rate, price index and output gap. We assume that monetary policy does not 
react immediately to monthly released data on inflation and output gap. The shapes of 
responses are very similar to those usually obtained in canonical or structural VAR: without 
any forward variable, like commodity prices, a monetary policy shock produces a “price 
puzzle” and a lower output gap, except in Sweden where the immediate, though temporary, 
price decline is concomitant with a significant positive, though temporary, response of the 
output gap. Consistency of all these responses with usual IRFs confirms that the model and 
specification are appropriate.  
 
3.3.2 Stable sample with 3 states 
 
Robust estimations over a sample characterised by a stable economic environment will rule 
out the usual criticism that IT was performed after inflation had been tamed. In the case of 
Sweden, the fact that the sample starts in 1987 constitutes a robustness check in itself. The 
short sample begins after the high inflation then disinflation periods; it also begins after the 
literature usually dates the most significant change in monetary policy in OECD countries21. 
Detection of a regime switch over this “stable sample” is a robust characterisation of an IT 
regime beyond inflation outcomes: IT regime is also characterised by output outcomes and the 
policy rate. Estimations for Canada and the UK on the “stable sample” 1987-2006 were 
performed and results underline changes in intercept and variance. Figure 10 for Canada 
confirms the conclusion of Figure 4 that a regime (Regime 2) dominates most of the IT period 
and may be associated with it. Contrary to Figure 4, Regime 2 is prominent earlier, i.e. also 
during the transition period to full IT completion. Figure 11 for the UK shows a break 
occurring simultaneously with the adoption of IT; this break was already distinguishable on 
Figure 5.  
 
Table 3 reports the intercepts and variance of the three regimes for Canada and the UK on the 
short sample. In Canada, variance and the intercept in the CPI equation are minimised under 
the IT regime. In the UK, the constant term in the CPI equation captures the most substantial 
part of reduced uncertainty under the IT regime; variance is above that occurring under 
regime 2 by .0005; this is dramatically insufficient to reverse the optimal feature of the IT 
regime: minimising uncertainty. 
 
3.3.3 Stable sample with 2 states 
 
On figures 12 to 14 and in table 4, we also report results from specification intercept and 
variance only with 2 rather than 3 regimes on the short sample. Figures 10 and 11 displayed a 
somewhat artificial distinction between regimes 1 and 2. The clearest outcome was the very 
low probability of occurrence of regime 3 after IT had been adopted. With only two regimes, 
we can also check the robustness of our conclusions on Sweden.  
 
In Sweden, but also in the UK, a regime is distinctly attributable to the IT framework: shortly 
before the end of 1992, a regime appeared and it has been exclusive ever since. The lower 
uncertainty property of IT regime is confirmed by intercepts and variance outcomes (table 4).  
 
                                                 
21 For instance, Clarida and al. (2000) use 1979 (the beginning of the Volcker mandate) or 1982 (after “Volcker 
disinflation”) as thresholds for subsamples. 
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The case of Canada is less clear-cut: it shows a lower variance and intercept for a regime 
which encompassed the whole time period. The second regime occurred only during the 
transition period to IT adoption. Therefore, none of the two regimes can be attributed to IT.  It 
is noteworthy that this second regime is similar to regime 3 within the 3-state specification 
(see supra). Comparing the 3-state specification with the 2-state specification, it can be 
asserted that the regime whose properties are closest to an IT regime is merged with the 
regime which occurred before IT was adopted. Tables 3 and 4 confirm this conclusion. 
 
3.3.4 Comparison with the US 
 
One may ask whether the changes underlined previously have been common to a non-IT 
country. In this respect, we have chosen the US as a benchmark because of its clear difference 
in terms of monetary policy framework vis-à-vis IT countries. Indeed, the Federal Reserve 
publishes its forecasts with a 5-year lag compared to IT central banks for which transparency 
and communication issues are essential. Moreover, the objective of economic growth is more 
pronounced in the Fed statutes, whereas IT central banks focus primarily on inflation. Table 5 
reports intercepts and variance of specification 2 with 2 regimes in the US case22.  
 
Over a long horizon (1971-2006) and with 3 regimes, figure 15 shows that a regime (the 
second one) has become prominent, although not exclusive, after 1988. Contrary to what 
happened in IT countries, this prominent regime cannot be chronologically associated with a 
specific change in the institutional monetary framework. Over the short sample which is 
generally associated from beginning to end with the “great moderation era”, two regimes are 
intertwined (see figure 16) and one cannot draw conclusions on the superiority of one regime 
over the other. Regime 1 shows better performance than regime 2 in terms of lower intercept 
in the CPI equation and variance. However, uncertainty has decreased more substantially in 
IT countries under the IT regime than in the US under regime 2 (table 6)23. One conclusion 
arises: there are specific benefits to IT adoption which have not been shared by a non-IT 
country like the US. 
 
At this stage, three results are worth summarizing: first, despite their differences, the three IT 
countries witnessed a regime switch after IT adoption. Second, this switch is visible too on a 
sample which is characterised by a relatively stable macroeconomic environment. Third, a 
comparison with the US has revealed differences which emphasize the specific outcomes of 
IT countries.  
 
Two comments emerge. First, a conclusive comment: the regime switch is robust to a change 
in the sample and to an international comparison. Second, a prospective comment: inflation 
outcomes are not the sole exclusive link with IT; the sacrifice ratio of achieving low inflation 
has to be investigated. So does the variability of the policy rate. In order to perform such 
investigation, counterfactuals are set up.  
 
                                                 
22 Data were taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Board, except the output gap whose source is the 
OECD.  
23 The change in uncertainty has corresponded to the change in the variance and the intercepts during IT regime 
for IT countries or during regime 2 for the US, compared to their corresponding outcomes in the previous 
regime. We have excluded Canada for which the switch in the small sample is blurred.  
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3.4. Counterfactuals 
 
Results of the first specification suggest that there is no coefficients switch with the adoption 
of IT; it is then possible to escape from the Lucas critique and to provide some historical 
counterfactuals based on the second specification; then we can assess how and the extent to 
which the optimal path of the policy rate, the inflation rate and the output gap have changed 
over time.  
 
In this exercise, coefficients are the same across regimes, and the differences among them 
stem from the intercepts and variances, that we choose to set at values of the IT regime. To 
obtain the path of the policy instrument as it would have evolved, had IT been adopted at the 
beginning of the sample, we simulate the policy equation without the disturbance term. With 
this optimal simulated rule, we compute the corresponding inflation rate and output gap over 
the full sample. These counterfactuals do not provide assessment of the stance of monetary 
policy across time per se, but they suggest levels of the variables and the macroeconomic 
effect of the IT framework. 
 
Results are reported on Figures 17 to 19. In the following, we compare the situation where IT 
regime would have always dominated the other two regimes with the actual evolution of the 
different endogenous variables. As far as interest rates are concerned, their variations would 
have been smoother over the whole sample. Moreover, interest rates would have been 
relatively low earlier, then they would have been higher: since 2001 in Canada, 1996 in 
Sweden and 2000 in the UK. We interpret this latter result as a higher monetary leeway 
enabling to face a negative shock with a sharp fall in the interest rate. This interpretation is 
confirmed by the evolution of the price index: in the three countries, disinflation would have 
occurred earlier, but inflation rates would have been higher after 1983, though to a lesser 
extent in Canada. Thus the scope for achieving low real interest rates would have been higher 
in the recent history. Fluctuations in the inflation rate would have been smoother in Sweden 
and the UK; but it would have remained broadly similar in Canada. The evolution of the 
output gap in the three countries would have been broadly similar under IT regime and the 
results do not point to an increase in the sacrifice ratio under IT regime.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The MSVAR methodology has revealed that in different countries like Canada, Sweden and 
the UK, the adoption of inflation targeting has given rise to a regime switch. The latter has not 
been characterised by a change in the coefficients of the monetary policy rule per se; rather, it 
has been characterised by lower intercept and variances, hence a better predictability of policy 
responses. Finally, a counterfactual exercise has shown that IT could give more monetary 
leeway, i.e. central banks under an IT regime could achieve a lower real interest rate, to be 
compared with situation where the same central banks were not actually under IT regime. In 
the face of a negative shock, this potentially low real interest rate can be viewed as a further 
gain associated with the adoption of IT.  
 
It is interesting to make a comparison across IT countries: the switch has been extremely 
pronounced in the UK and Sweden, for which the central bank has adopted all the features 
advocated for in this framework. On the contrary, Canada does not publish its forecasts. This 
is a major difference with the two other countries since IT is aimed at better anchoring 
expectations and requires communication to be at the forefront. 
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The return of worldwide inflation over the recent years challenges the optimality of monetary 
policies: central bankers are relatively deprived of means in the face of externally-driven 
inflation, as it is the case in most OECD countries. If the price shocks are concomitant with a 
slower growth process, the monetary leeway that IT has been shown to provide may be 
viewed as an incentive for new countries to adopt IT.  
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Figure 1 
Full changes specification probabilities – Canada 
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Figure 2 
Full changes specification probabilities – UK 
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Figure 3 
Full changes specification probabilities – Sweden 
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Figure 4 
Variances only specification probabilities – Canada 
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Figure 5 
Variances only specification probabilities – UK 
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Figure 6 
Variances only specification probabilities – Sweden 
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Figure 7 
Impulse Response Function, Intercept and Variances Only Model 
Canada 
 
Note: First line reports central bank rate shock, second line CPI shock and third line output gap shock. 
 
 
Figure 8 
Impulse Response Function, Intercept and Variances Only Model 
UK 
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Figure 9 
Impulse Response Function, Intercept and Variances Only Model 
Sweden 
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Figure 10 
Variances only specification probabilities – Canada 
Short sample: 1987-2006 
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Figure 11 
Variances only specification probabilities – UK 
Short sample: 1987-2006 
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Figure 12 
Variances only specification probabilities – Canada 
Short sample: 1987-2006 
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Figure 13 
Variances only specification probabilities – UK 
Short sample: 1987-2006 
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Figure 14 
Variances only specification probabilities – Sweden 
Short sample: 1987-2007 
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Figure 15 
Variances only specification probabilities – US 
Full sample: 1971-2006 
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Figure 16 
Variances only specification probabilities – US 
Short sample: 1987-2006 
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Figure 17 
Actual (black thin line) versus Counterfactual (red thick line) 
Canada 
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Figure 18 
Actual (black thin line) versus Counterfactual (red thick line) 
UK 
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Figure 19 
Actual (black thin line) versus Counterfactual (red thick line) 
Sweden 
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Table 1.  Intercepts and variance in specification 2, full sample 
 
  Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
  intercept variance intercept variance intercept variance 
CANADA IT       
CPI Equation 0.008220   0.058003*  0.101542   
 (0.017639) 0.011019*** (0.029924) 0.059398*** (0.114412) 0.653884***
Gap Equation 0.010809 (0.001301) 0.005125 (0.006406) 0.000300 (0.091777) 
  (0.013827)   (0.019499)   (0.043911)   
UK     IT     
CPI Equation 0.213095**   0.089906  0.830995***   
 (0.074676) 0.071268*** (0.034726) 0.043044*** (0.115325) 0.791094***
Gap Equation 0.064918 (0.020045) 0.015183 (0.002688) -0.017008 (0.077882) 
  (0.069232)   (0.035305)   (0.085425)   
SWEDEN IT       
CPI Equation 0.006919   0.063408  0.047167   
 (0.018877) 0.012864*** (0.063326) 0.111488*** (0.425872) 2.071731***
Gap Equation 0.021899 (0.001140) 0.001512 (0.018923) -0.022024 (0.557700) 
 (0.018797)   (0.055976)  (0.483868)   
 
 
Table 2. 
Long Run Policy Responses 
 Canada UK Sweden 
Responses of R to    
inflation 1.4939 0.4422 2.4030 
output gap 0.0150 0.3559 1.0942 
 
 
Table 3.  Intercepts and variance in specification 2, short sample 
 
  Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
  intercept variance intercept variance intercept variance 
CANADA    IT     
CPI Equation 0.104700***   0.087920***  0.177222   
 (0.027687) 0.014653*** (0.022543) 0.013689*** (0.129125) 0.414223***
Gap Equation 0.002437 (0.002220) 0.008983 (0.001369) -0.002306 (0.075378) 
  (0.025252)   (0.021446)   (0.145360)   
UK IT        
CPI Equation -0.133035***   -0.811609***  -0.442344***   
 (0.035411) 0.015551*** (0.050815) 0.015011*** (0.101815) 0.250457***
Gap Equation 0.011208 (0.001245) 0.023691 (0.002438) 0.023825 (0.036258) 
  (0.026774)   (0.039421)   (0.087944)   
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Table 4. Intercepts and variance in specification 2, short sample 
 
  Regime 1 Regime 2 
  intercept variance intercept variance 
CANADA    IT 
CPI Equation 0.174092   0.092911***  
 (0.111872) 0.356594*** (0.024477) 0.019361*** 
Gap Equation 0.002066 (0.068475) 0.006904 (0.001545) 
  (0.226008)   (0.030491)   
UK IT    
CPI Equation 0.234469***   1.070491***  
 (0.050196) 0.043142*** (0.146753) 0.186776*** 
Gap Equation 0.003676 (0.002690) -0.018360 (0.027981) 
  (0.045831)   (0.128010)   
SWEDEN IT   
CPI Equation 0.013598   0.127047  
 (0.025301) 0.019316*** (0.147289) 0.770464*** 
Gap Equation 0.021904 (0.001890) -0.004862 (0.130457) 
 (0.021241)   (0.130172)  
 
 
Table 5. Intercepts and variance in specification 2, short sample 
 
  Regime 1 (Post-93) Regime 2 
 USA intercept variance intercept variance 
CPI Equation 0.074574***   0.136363***   
 (0.022270) 0.004250*** (0.032859) 0.024911*** 
Gap Equation 0.026762 (0.000655) 0.033974 (0.002286) 
 (0.022809)   (0.036063)   
 
 
Table 6. 
Coefficient of Reduction of Uncertainty 
between IT* regimes and its preceding regime 
 Coefficient 
UK 4.97 
SWEDEN 16.61 
US 3.11 
* For US, it corresponds to the regime starting in 1993 
on the Figure 16  
 
 
 
 37
 38
Appendix A – Canonical VAR residuals 
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Appendix B – Full sample 
 
Transition matrix for Full changes specification – Canada 
0.7095 0.2781 0.3685 
0.2158 0.6212 0.1820 
0.0747 0.1007 0.4495 
 
Transition matrix for Full changes specification – UK 
0.6725 0.7229 0.4646 
0.1636 0.1446 0.1760 
0.1639 0.1325 0.3594 
 
Transition matrix for Full changes specification – Sweden 
0.6237 0.2032 0.3952 
0.1857 0.7807 0.1020 
0.1906 0.0161 0.5028 
 
Transition matrix for Variances only specification – Canada 
0.8252 0.1089 0.0010 
0.1687 0.7692 0.5078 
0.0061 0.1219 0.4912 
 
Transition matrix for Variances only specification – UK 
0.1794 0.0274 0.0982 
0.6881 0.8110 0.5524 
0.1325 0.1617 0.3494 
 
Transition matrix for Variances only specification – Sweden 
0.8928 0.2648 0.1473 
0.1072 0.6267 0.3359 
0.0000 0.1085 0.5168 
 
 
Appendix C – Short sample 
 
Transition matrix for Variances only specification – Canada 
0.5679          0.1677          0.2568 
0.3137          0.7587          0.4530 
0.1185          0.0736          0.2903 
 
Transition matrix for Variances only specification – UK 
0.7545          0.4769          0.0906 
0.2455          0.2749          0.2652 
0.0000          0.2481          0.6442 
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